

II. SPECIFIC COMMENTS~~TOP SECRET~~
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PAR. 4 - last sentence. Not only has the growth of Western strength made the Kremlin more carefully weigh the risks of further expansionism but it also, as brought out clearly in pars. 15-17, has increased the danger of general war through miscalculation or deliberate Soviet preventive action. Consequently, we propose an additional sentence: " Simultaneously, they have increased the danger of general war, either through miscalculation resulting from a local clash of interests or deliberate Soviet action before the West has achieved an adequate position of strength."

PAR. 27. There is no mention of the point made in Appendix A that the contribution of these countries will materially strengthen the Western coalition.

Moreover, the problem is not just whether the closer ties of each of these countries with NATO will in itself call forth some form of Soviet counteraction (we agree that this alone probably would not lead to war), but that the cumulative impact of these developments, plus all the other developments strengthening NATO (such as US and UK rearmament, etc.) may lead the USSR to consider that its vital interests were sufficiently threatened to require general war (par. 17). Therefore, while the USSR may not consider any one of our moves in Europe as in itself a critical threat, it may consider that one of these moves is the final point at which the USSR must call a halt or fight.

PAR. 30. In the Near and Middle East the chief threat is not so much that of Soviet cold war expansionism, which does not appear immediate, but the internal weaknesses and anti-Westernism of the area which hampers us in attempting to strengthen the area against Soviet occupation in event of war. Our chief problems in this area do not arise from Soviet cold war pressures (except possibly in Iran), but from forces within the area itself.

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Par. 39. As indicated in the first of our major comments above we do not believe that the US will have passed through the most dangerous and critical period until the defense of Western Europe seems assured. Moreover, as indicated in the second of our major comments above, we believe that increases in Soviet strength over the next two years may be such that presently projected US and Allied programs will not be sufficient to materially close the gap between Western and Soviet strength. We cannot suggest any mere alternate wording because if the two points above are correct, a "fundamental reconsideration of our foreign policy and security programs" would, as stated in par. 39, be necessary.

Par. 45. As indicated in Section B of our broad comments, we question whether our present programs for building up Western European defense are in phase with our other programs or are adequate. If we are to continue to follow a limited mobilization policy of the presently scheduled magnitude, is not some shift of priorities to permit a more rapid build-up in Western Europe essential? Throughout Part II wholly inadequate attention is given to the foreign aid aspects of our NSC 68 programs.

Par. 51 and 52. This section on Political and Psychological Strategy places its entire emphasis on strategy vis-a-vis the Soviet orbit and wholly neglects our strategy vis-a-vis the free world. If our primary emphasis during the next two years is to be directed primarily to building strength in the free world (first sentence, par. 53), what politico-psychological strategy should we employ? We suggest at least one paragraph on this, emphasizing means of reviving the morale of Western Europe, achieving greater political unity, convincing the Asian peoples of our mutual interest in combating the Soviet threat, building up the UN, etc.

Moreover, re par. 52, if we desire to act ~~EXTRINSICALLY~~ cautiously and to avoid provocative actions until we are strong enough to support them, shouldn't the emphasis in our political and psychological operations (covert as well as overt) be more on showing up the free world than on attempting to undermine the Soviet orbit? In any case can't far greater results be accomplished in the free world areas where we can operate with a minimum of handicap and secure a maximum of results than behind the Iron Curtain where ever tighter Soviet controls make it exceedingly difficult to operate?

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Par. 55. Once again the draft admits that we are well behind in our objective of creating adequate defensive strength in Western Europe, but does not suggest means of meeting this problem.

We suggest adding to the next to last sentence the following clause:

"and greater efforts, both on our part and on that of our NATO allies, are called for to meet this critical problem."

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